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LOGICAL SEQUENCES FOR MAKING
TERMINAL DECISIONS WITHIN A BAYESIAN
FRAMEWORK - MEASURING THE VALUE
OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION *
lk-\Vhan Kwon

and

Wou Wei

Decision-making under conditions of uncertainty always presents problems to the decision maker ,ince information essential for an optimum
decision is missing or only partially provided. Furthermore, an apparent
optimum decision in one time period may not be a n optimum decision in
another time period, as the ,1a1e of nature varies with social, politii:al and
technological changes. Accordingly, the decision maker is constantly in
need of additional information to improve the quality of the terminal decision.
The critical question at this point is to estimate the value of such additional information. For example, if the value of additional information is
less than the COM of obtaining such information, it is ob,ious that the additional information should not be sought. Accordingly, a measurement
of the value and co,1 of additional information becomes an essential decision criterion in the decision-making process under conditions of uncertainty.
The modern, or Bayesian, decision theory is known to provide the decision maker with an efficient statistical method which makes possible the
mea,urement of the value of additional information. Furthermore,
because of its ability to quantify the degree of uncertainty and explicitly incorporate into the decision model all relevant information, including any
subjective opinions on the decision maker, the Bayesian decision model
has gained popularity in academic circles as well as in industry, government, and medicine since the early l970's, as evidenced by the growing
,olume of publications on Bayesian decision theory. ' This paper will
examine the operational framework of Bayesian decision-making sequences under conditions of uncertainty; special attention will be given to
the methodological process of measuring the value of additional information.
In general, a terminal decision under conditions of uncertainty can be
made at 1hree tlifferent but seq uential s1ages: terminal tlecision with no
prior information (Phase No. 1); terminal decision with prior information
(Phase No. 2); and, terminal decision with posterior information (Phase
No. 3).

• We would like to express o ur thank s to Rick Yeazy of Saint Louis
University, Gordon Wilson of AMAX, Inc. anti Tom Vogler of Sisters of
St. Mary - Data Center for their helpful suggestions.
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If the decision maker has to mah the terminal decision in complete
ignorance as to the various state~ ?f nature surrounding t_he problem. _h~ is
said to make the terminal dec1s1on und,·r Phase I. Smee the dec1s1on
maker has no knowledge as to the state of nature, the attitude of the decision maker toward uncertaint y becomes a crucial decision factor. In other
words, the optimum decision may be different depending upon whether
the decision maker is pessimistic (conservative), optimistic (gambler) or a
type somewhere in between. In somewhat more formal terms, selection of
the optimum decision will depend on the utility function of the decision
maker.
The decision maker is said to be operating under Phase 2 if the terminal
decision is made on the premise of initial (prior) information only, without
benefit of further research or sampling. Wheth er the decision maker is
satisfied with the quality of the terminal decision at this phase depends
primarily upon the importance of the decision and the su rrounding uncertainty. If the degree of uncertainty is su bstantial, additional information
may be in order. However, before taking any final action toward obtaining the additional information. a cost/benefit analysis utilizing Bayesian
techniques should be performed to measure the net gain to be derived. If
the cost of obtaining additional information is greater than the gain from
the additional information, the decision maker has to be satisfied with the
terminal decision at Phase 2. If cost / benefit analysis indicates that additional information is worthwhile, the terminal decision should be deferred
until the posterior information is available (Phase 3). The following case.
admittedly oversimplified, illustrates some basic methods of handling
uncertainty, including the primary and unique contributions of the Ba>esian method.

Case
The decision-making process under uncertainty de~cribcd above is
shown in the Decision Chart along v.ith the corresponding decision critena
in each decision phase.
Suppose that you are one of the two leading producers of an electronic information switching system used in hospitals. Both you and your rnmpetitor are currently considering developing a new system which is considerably smaller in size but more efficient and at an almost identical cost.
If your company is successful in developing and eventually marketing the
product ahead of your competitor, it is estimated that $100 million in
profit will materialize. However. if you commit yourself to developing the
product, but your competitor introduces it first, it is projected that your
company may face a $70 million loss. You v. ill incur neither gain nor loss if
you choose not to develop the system regardless of your competitor's
action.
Let A 1 represent the course of action that you develop the new product
and A2 be an alternative course of action where you "do nothing." Let
B1 be a state of nat ure that you develop and market the new product
ahead of your compet ito r and B2 represent the state of nature that you fai l
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DECISION-MAKING CHART
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS STA RTS

Phase I
No Prior
Informal ion
a.
b.
c.
d.

Phase II
Prior
Information

Minimax
Maxima~
Regrets
Indifference

Phase Ill
Posterior
Informal ion

is EVP10 Large?

No

Is Sampling free'!

Ves

Preposterior Analysis

Is DIGS)O?

Yes

No

PHASE I
20

PHASE II

PHASE Ill

market ahead of him (your competitor is first, with subsequent $70
million loss to you). This situation, as mentioned , applies equally well to
your competitor's position. The problem is represented in the following
decision matrix:
10

Table I : Electronic Informatio n Switch S}stem
(Profit: $ Million)
State of
Nature

B1 (Ahead)
B2 (Late)

Course of Action
A1 (New product)
A2 (Do nothing)

$100

-$ 70

0
0

Terminal Decisio n at Phase I (with No Prior Information)

Suppose that you have no knowledge as to the chances of ,uccessfully
developing and marketing the ne"' product ahead of your competitor
(state of nature BJ). Under such circumstances, in an effort to obtain an
optimum deci~ion, you may use one of the following four decision criteria
depending upon your attitude toward risk : minimax, maximax, minimax
regrets, or indifference. as shown in the Decision Chan.
Minimax C riterion: Suppose that you are b~ically a conservative decision maker who prefers a small gain with certainty rather than risking a
loss in pursuit of a larger gain. You then tend to concentrate on the worst
possible outcome which could re~ult from the entire range or actions
available to you. Accordingly, you select the course of action "hich entails
the minimum possible loss (minimi1es the maximum loss). For example,
the worst possible outcome from A I is a loss of $70 million if your product
arrives belatedly (82). The worst outcome from A2 is of cour,c Lero. Accordingly,the optimum decision for a conservative decision mal..er ,hould
be the course of action A2.
Maximax: Suppose that you are an optimistic decision maker who
would prefer a chance at a large gain to a small return with certainty. You
observe everything through a rosy \\indoY.. . Under such cin:umstancc,,
you select the course of action which is capable of producing the large~t
possible return. In o ur example the optimum decision would be. of
course, AJ since it is capable of producing S100 million profit as opposed
to nothing from A2. The optimistic deci,ion maker usually maximizes the
maximum returns (maximax).
Minimax Regrets: This decision criterion is al,o con,ervative in the sen~e
that the decision maker attempts to minimi7e the worst possible outcome.
However, there is a difference in how the worst possible outcome is defined. Unlike minimax criterion, the decision maker who uses the minimax
regrets criterion estimates first the amount of "regret" (opportunity loss)
for each course of action under each correspo nding state of nature. For
example, if you selected A I and your product arrived ahead of your competito r's (B1). you would have no opportunity loss (no regret s), since you
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made a right decision. However, what happens if you selected Az and e1
was the true state of nature? The amount of opportunity loss would be
$100 million as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Opportunity Loss ($ Million)
Stat e of
Nature

Course of Action
AJ

A2

$100
-$ 70

0
0

O ppo rtunity Loss (Regrets)
At

A2

0
70

$100

O

On the other hand, if state of nature B2 prevails (which is equally likely),
the amount of regrets would be S70 million to you if you elected A1. The
optimum decision for you if B2 occurs would then be Az, in which case
you would have no regrets.
You would then list the largest regret from each course of action: $70
million from A1 and SIOO million from Az.The optimum decision is o f
cour~e A 1 because it can result in only a S70 million regrets as opposed IO
S100 million for A2. In other words, you minimize the maximum regrets
(minimax regrets). The minimax regrets criterion has an advantage over
the minimax criterion in that the former provides the decision maker with
a measure of uncertainty which is a very important decision criterion, as
discussed in Phase 2.
Indifference: Finally, su ppose that you are indifferent and neither con~ervative nor optimistic as to the likelihood of the state of nature; you do
not have any opinion one way or the other whether B1 or B2 is more likely. As a result, you assign an equal weight (50:50) to 81 and Bz. How do
you evaJuate the course of action which has a 50:50 chance to give $100
million profit and $70 million loss? One possible way v.ould be to compute
the weighted average return from each course of action. For example, the
weighted average return for A1 would be $100 million x 0.5 + (-$70)
million x 0.5 = $15 million and that for A2 would be zero. The optimum
decision would then be to take A 1. Although this is similar to the minimax
regrets approach, it introduces a more formal handling of probabilities in
general (50:50 in this case) which, as we will sec below, can be applied in a
wide variety of circumstances.
Terminal Decision at Phase 2 {with Prior Information)
The decision criteria di~cussed in preceding sect ions may be used when
the decision maker either docs 001 have prior information or the decision
itself is simple enough to make without formally analyzing any existing information. In most cases, however, the decision maker indeed has acertain degree of information on the state of nature and the decisio n is serious
enough to fully evaluate such existing information.
If the existing information is reliable and, therefore, the uncertainty is
small. the terminal decision can be made without any additional informa22

· (as shown in the Chart). However, if the existing prior information_is
uon eliable' and consequently sizeable uncertainty
·
·
· ·
h h1
exists,
II 1s wort w I e
1

~;c~nsider gathering additional informati~n: In other words'. ~he an_10unt
of uncertainty is a crucial factor in determining whether add1t1onal mfo~mation is justified. Therefore, it fol(o_ws th~t the degree of uncertainty 1s
an indication as to the value of addllwnal information.
Let us illustrate this point further hy using the ~ame problem that
discussed in the previous section where, in the absence of any relevant information, it was assumed that both you and your competitor ha~ equal
chance to successfully develop the product first. Now let u~ ~uppose that
you have reliable knowledge that there are 6 chances in 10 that you would
come up with the nc,... product ahead of him. Table 3 b~lo~ ~hows the nc\,
decision matrix where the deci~ion maker ha\ such pnor information.
Table 3: Deci~ion Matrh with Prior Information
(S Million)
State of
Nature

Prior

Cour-e of Action

0.6
0.4

100
0
-70
0
32
0
Expected Return

Information

At

A2

If the deci~ion maker has information that the chance is 60°'0 in fa,or of
Bt, the decision-mal..ing proces~ become, a matter of computing a
11eighted average return, or the expected monetary value (EM\'). The
EMVforA1,forcxample,wouldbeE(A1) = SIOOmillionx0.6 + (-S70
million) x 0.4 = $32 million and for A2 it would be E(A2) = 0. Since the
EMV for At is greater than for A2, the optimum deci~ion for you mu,t be
At (develop the product).
If the decision was made with reasonably reliable information, you
probably are satisfied with your decision at thi, point and do not need any
further evaluation as shown in the Chart. Ho,1e,er, if the decl\ion maker
is uncertain as to the quality of hi~ information, he should \Criou.!>IY consider further evaluation of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the·problem.
. For example, it was shown above that the optimum decision with the
given prior information was At, which would yield an EMV of $32
million. Let us ask the following unrealiMic but important que,tion , ~ince
the answer will provide a clue as to whether additional information is
needed. How much would you mak e if there were no uncertainty? As a
doctor may better diagnose a sick patient based on information gathered
from a healthy man, the decision maker can a~ses~ the quality of his ter23

minal decision by examining the returns under conditions of perfect information.
If there is no uncertainty, it is said that the decision maker has p erfect
knowledge on the state of nature; you know in advance whether you can
market the product ahead of him (B1) or later than him (8 2). For example, suppose that you know in advance that 81 will occur. Then the op_
timum decision would be AJ which would produce a $100 million return.
On the other hand, the optimum decision would be A2 if you know in
advance that 82 would eventuate.
As mentioned, the return for A1, if perfect information as to the existence of B1 were available, would be $100 million. However, since such a
favorable state of nature (8 f) occurs only 6 times out of 10, the expected
return for AJ under perfect information would be E(AJ) = $100 million x
0.6 + (-S70) million x O = S60 million. In other words, if there were to be
no uncertainty, you would expect to make $60 million profit.
However, it wa~ ~hown that the EMV for A1 under uncertainty was $32
million since there would be a 400-0 chance of making a $70 million mistake
(Table 3). Therefore, it follows that the amount of uncertainty expressed
in monetary terms, v.ould be $60 million - S32 million
$28 million. The
amount of uncertainty can be termed as the expected value of perfect information (EVPI), since this is the amount which equates the EMV under
uncertainty (S32 million) to the EMV under certainty ($60 million). The
deci,ion maker no1v has valuable information as to whether additional information is needed to improve the quality of the decision. If the amount
of uncertainty ($28 million) is considered too large, the decision maker
may \eek additional information.
Prepo~terior Anal}sis: A ~eriou, decision maker, however, seldom
jumps to the conclusion that gathering additional information is justified .
,olely because ,iteable uncertainty exists. Once the preliminary decision is
made a~ to the desirability of additional information, the decision maker
enters into the \o-called preposterior analysis stage, v. here the need for additional information is evaluated in relation to the cost of obtaining such
information in order to determine the expected net gain from sampling
(E"IGS). If the cost of additional information is greater than the value of
such information (ENGS is less than zero), it is not worthwhile seeking additional information. The terminal decision should then be based on prior
information alone, as shown in the Chart, despite considerable uncertainty as measured by EVPI. On the other hand, if ENGS is greater than zero,
or if additional information is free, the decision maker should gather
further data before entering into Phase 3, Decision-Making with Posterior
Information.
Let us suppose that it would cost your company approximately $5
million for the next two year5 to hire a leading consulting company to
assess the need for additional information about your competitor's progress. Would you use the service?
We already know that there is $28 m illion worth of uncertainty as
measured by EVPI. Therefore, if t he consulting compan y con tributes to
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reducing uncertainty by more than $5 million, it is worthwhile hiring the
consulting company.' It is now clear that the amount or value of uncertainty (EVPI) is also the maximum price one would pay for perfect information-$28 million in the case under consideration. It follows, therefore,
that EVPI is the decision criterion which measures the value of additional
information.
Term inal Decision At Phase 3 (~ith Posterior Information)
If the cost of obtaining additional information were less than its value
and the decision maker subsequently concluded to accumulate and
analyze additional information, he would enter into Phase 3, Posterior
Analysis. The decision process here is fairly similar to that in Phase 2,
Decision-Making Process with Prior Information, except that the decbion
maker now has revised information. The revised, or posterior information, supposedly is more reliable since it is derived by revising prior probabilities based on additional information; consequently the terminal decision is assumed more reliable than if made in Phases I or 2.
Using the same illustration. let us study the decision-making process in
Phase 3 to observe how the prior information is incorporated with additional information. Suppose that according to an educated guess by the
consulting company, the chances are 4 in 5 that your competitor\\ ill build
a new plant if he .has already developed the nev.. product. On the other
hand, the chances are 9 in 10 against building a new plant if he has failed
to successfully develop the product. According to reliable information,
your competitor has applied for a building permit with City Hall to build
another plant. In light of this nev.. information, what are the odds that
your competitor will market the product ahead of you (B2) and \\hat implications does this have for your own decision to de,·elop the product?
Table 4 shows the process of deriving the posterior probabilities from
prior and additional information.

Table 4: Posterior Information

State of

Nalure
B1
B2

Prior
Additional
Information In formation
(l)
(2)

0.6
0.4
1.0

0.1
0.8

Joint
lnform:1tion

(3) = Oh(2J
0.06
0.32
0.38

Po~terior
Information
14) = ( 3) L <3l

0.16
0.84
1.00

Cha nces are 4 in 5 (or 800Jo) of your competitor building a ncv.. plant if
he has already developed the new product. On the other hand, it is only I
in 10 (or IOOJo) that he would still build the nev. plant although he has not
developed the new product. It can be shov..n via Bayes' theorem' that the
revised probability for B1 is now 0.16 or 160Jo and it is 0.84 or 8-1°'0 for B2.
It is significant to note that prior to additional information the best infor-
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mation available was 60:40 in favor of 81. Now after additional research,
the chances of your competitor marketing ahead of you (82) has improved
to over 80% and your chance (BJ) has been reduced to 16% from 60%. In
other words. it is now almost certain that your competitor will market the
new product before you do. As a matter of fact, the EMV for you is now
E(A1) = SIOO million x 0.16 + (-70 million) x 0.84 = -$42.8 million or
S42.8 million loss as opposed to S32 million profit prior to the additional
information (Phase 2). Accordingly, the optimum decision for you at this
point should be not to develop the ne" product (A2).
How much has uncertainty been reduced as a result of additional information? Analogous to the above question is: what is the expected value of
sampling information (E VS!)? It wa, \hown before that the amount of
uncertainty (EVPI) is the difference between the EMV under certainty and
under uncertainty. The EMV for A J, after additional information, is
S42.8 million loss as shown before, and under certainty would now be $16
million profit [S100 million x 0.16 + (-$70 million) x OJ. Therefore. the
amount of uncertainty after the additional information is Sl6 million ($16
million - 0 - $16 million)'. Recall that there was S28 million worth of
uncertainty (see p. 24) prior to additional information. It follows,
therefore, that additional information reduced uncertainty by
430:o-(28-16)/28. The amount of difference in the EVP I before (S28
million) and after ($16 million) the additional information is called the expected value of sampling information (EVSI = $28 million - $16 million =
Sl2 million), and is an important decision criterion along with EVPl in the
decision-making proces\ under conditions of uncertainty. Finally, the expected net gain from additional information (ENGS) is $12 million - S5
million = $7 million. You could have lost S42.8 million without additional
information, but with additional information, you avoided such a loss by
taking A2.
S MMARY

The derivatio n of an optimum deci\ tOn under conditions of uncertainty
depends primarily upon the degree of uncertainty. If the decision maker
does not have any prior information, he may make the terminal decision
either without using additional information, provided the decision consequence\ arc not serious, or he may wait until a further analysis of uncertaint y complete (preposterior analy,h). A siLeable EVPI ma) ,ignal a
need for additional information. The value of additional information cannot be judged solely hy the EVPI alone. It is quite possible for the decision
maker to reject the additional information if the cost of \UCh information
is greater than the value of information (ENGS < 0). It follows.
therefore, that before seeking additional information, the decision maker
should carry out the preposterior analysis to determine the net gain from
the ,ample (Phase 2).
The terminal decision with posterior information is made only when the
additional information is free or ib value is greater than its cost (Phase 3).
It is assumed that a terminal decision at Phase 3 is of better quality (or
lower EVP I) than if made in Phases I or 2.

,s
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FOOTNOTES
•For the elementary exposition of the Bayesian decision theory in
business application, see reference.
' When the prior information is less reliable, it is called diffuse prior informatio n.
' The consulting company certainly cannot reduce the amount of uncertainty more than $28 million (EVP I) .
'The Bayes' theorem is used to derive posterior information from prior
probability (information) and conditioned probability (sampling information) as shown below:
P(B·/ )
I s

=

P(Bj)P(s/ Bi)
P(B 1)P(s/ 81) + P(Bz)P(s/ 82)

P(Bi)P(s/ Bi)
L- P(s)

where
P(Bi) = prior information on states of nature
P(s) = sampling information
P(s/ 81) = sampling results given states of nature Bi
P(Bj/~) = posterior information
In our illustration,
P(Bi): P(B1) = 0.6
and
P(B2) = 0.4
P(s/Bi): P(s/ 81) = 0.1
and
P(s! Bz) = 0.8
Therefore,
P(B1 /s) = P(B1)P(s/ B1)
P(B1)P(s/ BJ) + P(B2)P(s/B2)

and
P(Bzls)

=

0.6x0. I
0.6x0. I + 0. 4x0.8

=

I-P(B1 /s)

=

1-0.16

0.06
0.38

=

0 _16

0.84

' Under the conditions of perfect information, you would not take the
course of action A I since you knew that B2 would o ccur. In this case the
EMV is of cour~e zero.
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